BVA Case 91-1665: Hip

The issue presented by this appeal is whether the Secretary's imposition by regulation of a causal nexus requirement, i.

Statutory Law The statute in effect when the appellant filed his claim for vocational rehabilitation in June 1989 did not require a causal nexus between a service-connected disability and an employment handicap.

) The issue before this Court is whether VA's imposition by regulation of a causal nexus, i.

Although earlier versions of the relevant statute did require a causal nexus between the service- connected disability and the employment handicap, see infra part III.

The language of the 1989 version, as well as that of the statute presently in effect, makes no reference whatsoever to such a nexus requirement.

The Secretary's Arguments As in Gardner, "[d]espite the absence from the statutory language of so much as a word about [a causal nexus], the Government proposes two interpretations in attempting to reveal a [causal nexus requirement] implicit in the text .

The first is that there is a "gap" in the statute which the Secretary is authorized to fill by regulation; the second is that § 3102 contains an implied causal nexus requirement.

The "Implied Causal Nexus" Argument This argument runs as follows: Because there are other statutes in chapter 31 that do contain express causal nexus requirements, it would lead to an "absurd result," and perhaps "raise concerns of fairness under the Constitution's Equal Protection Clause," if we refuse to infer such a requirement in § 3102.