BVA Case 21-2635: Ptsd

The RO advised the appellant that [e]fforts to obtain [his] service treatment records from all potential sources were unsuccessful and that [t]he [NPRC]reported that the records may have 1 The report also reflects diagnoses and a nexus opinion regarding musculoskeletal and neuropathic complaints.

In September 2018,the Board denied entitlement to benefits for PTSD and to TDIU and reopened and remanded the appellant's claim for benefits for an acquired psychiatric disorder other than PTSD.

Finally,the examiner opined that the appellant's psychiatric condition was less likely than not related to service.

In a June 2020 decision,the Board found the October 2019 VA examination report inadequate because it was based on an inaccurate factual premise,namely,that there was a lack of treatment between 1957 and 1973; yet the record includes statements from providers that the [appellant]sought treatment for 'emotional disturbances'between 1957 and 1959, treatment for 'nervousness'between 1960 and 1961,and was followed by a psychologist from 1962 to 1974 for emotional disturbances.

4 In the March 2021 decision on appeal,the Board determined that the appellant's psychiatric symptoms result in occupational and social impairment commensurate with a 50%disability rating,R.

Parties'Arguments The appellant argues that the Board provided inadequate reasons or bases for denying entitlement to an initial disability rating higher than 50%for major depressive disorder because the Board failed to apply the holistic analysis required by the Court's caselaw.

The Board's determinations of the proper disability rating and of whether a veteran is unable to secure or follow substantially gainful employment are findings of fact that the Court reviews under the clearly erroneous standard of review.

A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when the Court, after reviewing the entire evidence, is left with the definite 7 and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.