BVA Case 14-2165: Depression

Fernandez appeals a June 24,2014,Board of Veterans'Appeals (Board)decision wherein the Board determined that the character of his discharge from his period of service from March 1961 to March 1962 is a bar to receipt of VA disability compensation benefits based on that period of service.

In an October 2002 decision,the Board denied the appellant's disability compensation claims and determined that the appellant's undesirable discharge was the result of willful and persistent misconduct and constituted a bar to VA benefits based on his period of service from March 1961 to March 1962.

On June 24,2014,the Board denied the appellant's disability compensation claims for a chronic acquired psychiatric disorder,bilateral hearing loss,and tinnitus,and determined that the character of the appellant's discharge from his period of service from March 1961 to March 1962 is 6 a bar to receipt of VA disability compensation benefits based on that period of service.

Upon review of his arguments,the Court is not persuaded that the Board erred when it determined that the appellant's discharge was under dishonorable conditions as a result of willful and persistent misconduct;however,the Court will vacate the Board's decision denying his claims for a chronic acquired psychiatric disorder,bilateral hearing loss,and tinnitus,and remand these matters for further adjudication consistent with this decision.

Character of Discharge A person seeking VA benefits must first establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the service member, upon whose service such benefits are predicated,has attained the status of veteran.

A Board determination regarding the character of a claimant's discharge is a finding of fact that this Court reviews under the clearly erroneous standard of review.

A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when the Court,after reviewing the entire evidence, is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.

Here,the Board noted that the episode leading to the appellant's Article 15 and both periods of AWOL resulted,at least in part,from his excessive alcohol use,and that the appellant had admitted in 1961 that he went AWOL because he desired to leave the Army.