judge_norm: ALAN S PEEVY

text: The appeal is denied.

text:
Citation Nr: 0403000
Decision Date: 02/02/04    Archive Date: 02/11/04

DOCKET NO.  98-05 335	)	DATE
	)
	)

On appeal from the
Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in St. Paul,
Minnesota

THE ISSUE

Entitlement to service connection for Post-Traumatic Stress
Disorder (PTSD).

REPRESENTATION

Appellant represented by:	Kenneth M. Carpenter,
Attorney-at-Law

ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD

Glenn Wasik, Counsel

INTRODUCTION

The veteran had active duty service from August 1972 to
January 1976.

This matter is before the Board of Veterans' Appeals (Board)
on appeal from a February 1997 rating decision by a Regional
Office (RO) of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA).  The
case was previously before the Board, and in December 1998,
the Board issued a decision which denied entitlement to
service connection for PTSD.  The veteran appealed the
Board's December 1998 decision to the United States Court of
Appeals for Veterans Claims (Court), which, by an Order dated
in October 2000, vacated the Board's decision denying
entitlement to service connection for PTSD.  The issue was
again before the Board in July 2001 and June 2003, at which
times it was remanded for additional evidentiary development.

By way of background, the Board observes that a claim of
entitlement to service connection for an acquired psychiatric
disability was denied by the RO in December 1995.  The
veteran appealed that denial to the Board, and the Board
denied the appeal in May 1996.  The veteran then appealed the
Board's decision to the Court, and the Court affirmed the
Board's decision in March 1998.  It appears that PTSD was not
considered in those decisions.  The issue of entitlement to
service connection for PTSD is therefore being addressed as
an original claim rather than an attempt to reopen a prior
final decision.

Further, the only issue now before the Board is entitlement
to service connection for PTSD.  A request to reopen the
claim of service connection for an acquired psychiatric
disability was denied in a May 1998 rating decision from
which the veteran did not appeal.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1.  The veteran did not engage in combat with the enemy.

2.  The veteran's claimed inservice stressors have not been
verified.

CONCLUSION OF LAW

PTSD was not incurred in or aggravated by the veteran's
active duty service.  38 U.S.C.A. �� 1110, 1131, 5107 (West
2002); 38 C.F.R. �� 3.303, 3.304 (1996); 38 C.F.R. �� 3.303,
3.304 (1996); 38 C.F.R. �� 3.303, 3.304 (2003).

REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION

 Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000

The Veterans Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (VCAA) redefines
VA obligations with respect to notice and duty to assist.
Regulations implementing the VCAA were issued in August 2001.
See 66 Fed. Reg. 45,620 (Aug. 29, 2001)  [codified at 38
C.F.R. �� 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159 and 3.326(a)].  Although the
veteran's claim was received in February 1997, before the
November 9, 2000 effective date of the new law, the VCAA
appears to be applicable in the present case because the
claim remained in a pending status before the Board.  See
Kuzma v. Principi, 341 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2003).

Notice

The VCAA requires that VA notify the claimant and the
claimant's representative of any information and any medical
or lay evidence, not previously provided to the Secretary,
that is necessary to substantiate the claim.  VA must also
advise a claimant which evidence the claimant must supply,
which evidence VA will obtain on his or her behalf and to
provide any evidence in the claimant's possession that
pertains to the claim.  See 38 U.S.C.A. � 5103; see also
Quartuccio v. Principi, 16 Vet. App. 183 (2002); Pelegrini v.
Principi, No. 01-944 (U.S. Vet. App. Jan. 13, 2004).

In the present case, the statement of the case and the
supplemental statements of the case cite the applicable law
and regulations and explain why the RO denied the veteran's
claim.  The August 2003 supplemental statement of the case
sets forth the text of the VCAA regulations.

In addition, the record shows that RO letters to the veteran
in September 2001 and July 2003 furnished notice duty to
assist obligations under the VCAA.  The collective effect of
the letters was to provide detailed information concerning
the evidence needed to support his claim for PTSD.  The
letters advised the veteran of the evidence already obtained
and further advised him that private or VA medical records
would be obtained if he provided the names and addresses of
all sources of treatment and the approximate dates of
treatment and if he filled out the appropriate consent form
where applicable.  The letters explained that the RO would
help him obtain evidence such as medical records if he
furnished enough information to enable VA to request them.
The forms required to authorize the release of private
medical records to VA were provided.  The letters
collectively served to put the veteran substantially on
notice of the requirements of the law, the evidence needed to
support his claim, the information he must supply to permit
VA assistance in developing his claim, and the evidence to be
procured by VA in furtherance of its duty to assist pursuant
to the requirements of Quartuccio.

The Board would note that the September 2001 letter was not
legally sufficient under the statutory requirements then in
effect, since it requested a 60-day reply and did not
adequately explain that the veteran had a full year in which
to submit the requested information or evidence.  See
Paralyzed Veterans of America, et. al. v. Secretary of
Department of Veterans Affairs (PVA), 345 F.3d 1334 (Fed.
Cir. 2003); Disabled American Veterans, et. al. v. Secretary
of Department of Veterans Affairs (DAV), 327 F.3d 1339 (Fed.
Cir. 2003).  The veteran's representative has also noted in
correspondence dated in February 2002, that the veteran had
not been afforded one year within which to supply additional
evidence prior to the RO's adjudication.  However, it appears
that the RO's July 2003 did inform the veteran that he had
one year to submit evidence.  At any rate, revisions to 38
U.S.C.A. � 5103 contained in the recently-enacted Veterans
Benefits Act of 2003, which was made effective retroactively
to November 9, 2000, the effective date of the VCAA, specify
that VA is not prohibited from making a decision on a claim
before the expiration of the one-year period after a notice
to the veteran and his representative of the information
needed to complete an application for benefits.  See the
Veterans  Benefits Act of 2003, P.L. 108--183, � ___, 117
Stat. 2651,  ___ (Dec. 16, 2003) [to be codified at 38 U.S.C.
� 5103(b)].  Any deficiency regarding the time period during
which the veteran could submit additional evidence has thus
been rectified by operation of the new law.

Lastly, the Board notes that in its recent decision in the
case of Pelegrini v. Principi, No. 01-944 (U.S. Vet. App.
Jan. 13, 2004), the Court held that to satisfy the statutory
requirements set forth in 38 U.S.C. � 5103(a), a VCAA notice
must be provided to a claimant before the "initial
unfavorable [agency of original jurisdiction] decision on a
service-connection claim."  To be consistent with 38 U.S.C. �
5103(a) and 38 C.F.R. � 3.159(b), the notice must: (1) inform
the claimant about the information and evidence not of record
that is necessary to substantiate the claim; (2) inform the
claimant about the information and evidence that VA will seek
to provide; (3) inform the claimant about the information and
evidence the claimant is expected to provide; and (4) request
or tell the claimant to provide any evidence in the
claimant's possession that pertains to the claim, or
something to the effect that the claimant should "give us
everything you've got pertaining to your claim(s)."

The September 2001 letter sent to the veteran clearly did not
satisfy the timing requirement established by the Court since
it was sent after the February 1997 rating decision on
appeal.  See Pelegrini v.  Principi, No. 01-944 (U.S. Vet.
App. Jan. 13, 2004).  However, VCAA had not even been enacted
at the time of the February 1997 rating decision from which
this appeal arises, and it was therefore impossible for VCAA
notice to be furnished prior to the initial denial.  The
Board notes, however, that the veteran appealed the February
1997 RO decision to the Board and in a December 1998
decision, the claim was denied.  Significantly, the veteran
appealed the Board's December 1998 decision to the Court who
then vacated it and returned it to the Board due to a change
in law which occurred during the pendency of the appeal.  In
July 2001, the Board remanded the issue of entitlement to
service connection for PTSD back to the RO.  The September
2001 letter was sent prior to the RO's readjudication of the
claim which occurred in December 2001.  Additionally,
development of the claim took place after the February 1997
rating decision, and by the time the veteran's claim was re-
adjudicated in December 2001, the claim had been fully
developed to the extent possible in the same manner as if a
notice complying with the Pelegrini requirements had been
timely sent.  Moreover, the veteran has been represented
throughout this appeal by a representative who has shown
through his communications and briefs that he is well-aware
of the provisions of VCAA.  The Board believes that the lack
of a Pelegrini notice before the initial adjudication of the
veteran's claim did not have the effect of prejudicing his
claim and that consideration of the appeal may proceed.
Bernard v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 384  (1993).

Duty to assist

The VCAA requires VA to make reasonable efforts to assist a
claimant in obtaining evidence necessary to substantiate a
claim for a benefit under a law administered by the Secretary
of Veterans Affairs, unless no reasonable possibility exists
that such assistance would aid in substantiating the claim.
38 U.S.C.A. � 5103A.

The record reflects that the relevant evidence in this case
has been developed to the extent possible.  All available
service department medical and personnel documents and all
available VA treatment records have been obtained and are of
record before the Board.  Private medical records have been
obtained.   The record does not identify any additional
private medical records for which reasonable procurement
efforts have not been made.

The veteran's representative has argued that the veteran must
be afforded a new VA examination for PTSD.  The Board notes
the duty to assist under the VCAA also includes providing a
medical examination or obtaining a medical opinion when such
is necessary to make a decision on the claim.  The Board
concludes, however, that no useful purpose would be served by
delaying the claim in order to examine the veteran or obtain
a medical nexus opinion.  See Charles v. Principi, 16 Vet.
App. 370, 374-75 (2002).  In the absence of evidence of a
verified PTSD stressor, referral of this case for an opinion
as to the etiology of the PTSD would, in essence, place the
examining physician in the role of a fact finder.  This is
the Board's responsibility.  In other words, any medical
opinion which provided a nexus between the post service
disability (or claimed post service disability) and his
military service would necessarily be based solely on the
veteran's uncorroborated assertions regarding what occurred
in service.  The Court has held on a number of occasions that
a medical opinion premised upon an unsubstantiated account of
a claimant is of no probative value.  See, e.g., Swann v.
Brown, 5 Vet. App. 229, 233 (1993) [generally observing that
a medical opinion premised upon an unsubstantiated account is
of no probative value, and does not serve to verify the
occurrences described]; Reonal v. Brown, 5Vet. App. 458, 461
(1993) [the Board is not bound to accept a physician's
opinion when it is based exclusively on the recitations of a
claimant].  The veteran's representative has acknowledged
that the veteran has not responded to several requests for
additional information concerning his alleged in-service
stressors.  Referral of this case for a nexus opinion under
the circumstances here presented would therefore be a useless
act.  Additionally, the veteran's representative correctly
points out that the Board's June 2003 remand only required
that a new examination be obtained if, and only if, a
confirmed stressor was found to exist.  Therefore, without
verification of the claimed stressors, the RO's failure to
obtain a VA examination is in compliance with the Board's
remand instructions.  See Stegall v. West, 11 Vet. App. 268,
271 (1998).

The Board finds that VA has done everything reasonably
possible to assist the veteran and that in the circumstances
of this case, additional efforts to assist him would serve no
useful purpose.  See Soyini v. Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 540,
546 (1991) (strict adherence to requirements in the law does
not dictate an unquestioning, blind adherence in the face of
overwhelming evidence in support of the result in a
particular case; such adherence would result in unnecessarily
imposing additional burdens on VA with no benefit flowing to
the veteran); Sabonis v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 426, 430 (1994)
(remands which would only result in unnecessarily imposing
additional burdens on VA with no benefit flowing to the
veteran are to be avoided).

Accordingly, VA has satisfied the notification and duty to
assist provisions of the law and no further actions pursuant
to the VCAA need be undertaken on the veteran's behalf.

Service Connection Criteria

Service connection for PTSD requires medical evidence
diagnosing the condition in accordance with 38 C.F.R. �
4.125(a), a link, established by medical evidence, between
current symptoms and an in-service stressor; and credible
supporting evidence that the claimed in-service stressor
occurred.  If the evidence establishes that the veteran
engaged in combat with the enemy and the claimed stressor is
related to that combat, in the absence of clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary, and provided that the
claimed stressor is consistent with the circumstances,
conditions, or hardships of the veteran's service, the
veteran's lay testimony alone may establish the occurrence of
the claimed in-service stressor.  See 38 C.F.R. � 3.304(f)
(2003).  The provisions of 38 C.F.R. � 4.125(a) require that
a diagnosis of a mental disorder conform to the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual, Fourth Edition (DSM-IV).

Prior to March 1997, 38 C.F.R. � 3.304(f) provided that
service connection for PTSD requires medical evidence
establishing a clear diagnosis of the condition, credible
supporting evidence that the claimed in service stressor
actually occurred, and a link, established by medical
evidence, between current symptomatology and the claimed in-
service stressor.  If the claimed stressor is related to
combat, service department evidence that the veteran engaged
in combat or that the veteran was awarded the Purple Heart,
Combat Infantryman Badge, or similar combat citation1 will be
accepted, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, as
conclusive evidence of the claimed in-service stressor.  38
C.F.R. � 3.304(f) (1996).  Both versions of 38 C.F.R. �
3.304(f) must be considered in the present case since the
change in regulation became effective during the course of
the veteran's appeal.

The Board acknowledges at this point that the claims file
includes diagnoses of PTSD by competent medical personnel.
Private medical records dated in May and June of 1996 include
diagnoses of PTSD along with depression.  There is also
medical evidence of record which includes diagnoses of mental
disorders other than PTSD including personality disorders and
dysthymic disorder.  However, the claim has been denied by
the RO because attempts to verify the claimed non-combat
stressors have been unsuccessful.  The Board notes the
veteran has not alleged that he participated in combat and
his military personnel records are devoid of any indication
that he participated in combat.

With respect to non-combat stressors, the Court has held that
credible supporting evidence of a non-combat stressor may be
obtained from service records or other sources.  See Moreau
v. Brown, 9 Vet. App. 389 (1996).  However, the Court has
also held that the regulatory requirement for "credible
supporting evidence" means that "the appellant's testimony,
by itself, cannot, as a matter of law, establish the
occurrence of a non-combat stressor."  See Dizoglio v. Brown,
9 Vet. App. 163 (1996).  Therefore, as the veteran is not
alleging that he engaged in combat, his statements alone
regarding the claimed stressors may not be accepted, but must
be corroborated.  This requirement is the same under both
versions of 38 C.F.R. � 3.304(f).

Factual Background

The veteran was found to be without defects at the time of
his service entrance examination which was conducted in July
1972.

In  May 1973, it was noted that the veteran attempted
suicide.  He reported that he was very depressed.  The
impression was suicidal gesture and question depression.  A
separate annotation indicated that no depression was noted
and that the veteran had immature responses and judgment.  It
was his fourth suicide attempt.

A separate medical record dated in May 1973 includes the
diagnosis of personality trait disturbance, immature
personality.  It was determined that the disability was not
incurred in the line of duty and was not due to the veteran's
own misconduct.

On a Report of Medical History which was completed by the
veteran in May 1976, he reported that he had or had had
depression or excessive worry as well as nervous trouble.  No
pertinent abnormality was noted on the report of the service
separation examination which was conducted in May 1976.

A May 1976 letter associated with the service medical records
indicates that the veteran had been evaluated on different
occasions for complaints of nervousness, insomnia, and poor
control of his temper.  The author noted that the veteran had
a long history of emotional difficulties throughout the
course of his three years of military service.  He had been
hospitalized four times for drug abuse.  It was the consensus
of the Mental Hygiene Consultation Service that the veteran's
difficulties related to a long standing personality disorder.
It was suggested that the veteran be removed from military
service due to his psychiatric problems.

The veteran's service personnel records do not include any
indication that the veteran participated in combat.  He
served in Germany from January 1973 to March 1974, as a cook,
casual and as a chaplin's assistant.

The veteran was hospitalized at a VA facility in September
1978.  The diagnosis at that time was situational
maladjustment.  He reported that he was upset and depressed
due to having lost his job and also due to the fact that his
wife was hospitalized.

A VA medical record dated in April 1992 indicates that the
veteran sought treatment for depression.  The assessment at
that time was dysthymia, rule out panic disorder and marital
problems.

On examination in May 1992, the veteran reported witnessing a
women who was blown up by a landmine as she attempted to
cross from East Germany to West Germany.  The impression from
the examination was adjustment disorder with depression.

On VA examination in November 1995, the veteran reported that
he witnessed a body hanging outside a window, apparently a
suspected drug informer.  He reported that he was being
treated for depression at the time of the examination.  The
Axis I diagnosis from the examination was history of polydrug
abuse and the Axis II diagnosis was personality disorder with
immature and passive dependent aspects.

Private clinical records dated in 1995 and 1996 indicate that
the veteran was being treated for depression and anxiety.  At
the time of a private psychiatric evaluation which was
conducted in March 1995, the veteran reported the presence of
depressive symptoms which had been present for a number of
years.  The diagnosis was recurrent major depression, rule
out dysthymia, rule out adjustment disorder with depressed
mood as well as rule out various personality disorders.

A private clinical record dated in May 1996 included the Axis
I diagnoses of recurrent major depression and PTSD.  No
military stressors were noted.  A separate record dated the
same month includes the notation that the veteran had a long
standing history of depression dating back to his late teens.

A private clinical record dated in June 1996 includes the
diagnoses of depression and PTSD.  It was noted that the
author did grief work with the veteran connected to his
military experience witnessing murders.

The veteran underwent psychological testing in January 1997.
At that time, he reported witnessing the death of another
individual and interpreted that death as a threat to his own
physical integrity.  He reported that he witnessed a man
hanging from a window and felt that it was related to a drug
investigation.  He reported that he witnessed other violent
deaths when he was assigned as a cook at the border.  He was
not involved in combat and never fired a weapon.  It was
noted that testing revealed that the veteran had many of the
symptoms associated with PTSD.  The events he described
during his tour of duty in Germany did seem to meet the
criteria established in DSM-IV but they were not as
convincing was is typical for the diagnosis.

A VA PTSD examination was conducted in January 1997.  It was
noted that psychological testing suggested that the veteran
had many of the symptoms of PTSD.  With regard to traumatic
incidents, the veteran reported that he heard about someone
from his unit who was thrown out of a second story window in
his barracks.  He thought this was related to informing on
drug use.  He also reported hearing of someone hanging
himself in the unit just before the veteran arrived there.
The veteran reported that he did not witness or experience
the events, however, they caused him to be somewhat anxious
and leery when he first got to his unit.  He reported his
main stressor was when he and a fellow serviceman were in an
area where they were not supposed to be when they witnessed
East Germans shooting at someone who was trying to cross over
to the west.  He reported that he witnessed the body go down
at about 100 yards, but he did not go closer and he did not
see any evidence of blood or other consequences of the
shooting.  He indicated that he could not tell anyone about
the incident as he was not supposed to be there.  He denied
witnessing any other traumatic events.  He denied being in
combat, firing his weapon or being shot at.  The examiner
noted that the veteran described what appeared to be a
history of depression and some paranoia starting in the
military service, at the same time as his amphetamine and
marijuana use started.  The Axis I diagnoses from the
examination were history of likely substance induced
affective and paranoid disorder; dysthymic disorder, rule out
major depressive disorder.  The Axis II diagnosis was
personality disorder, not otherwise specified.  The examiner
noted that the veteran's report of a traumatic event was
somewhat atypical in comparison to the range of other traumas
seen by the examiner.  The veteran reported witnessing a
shooting from approximately 100 yards away, to which he was
unable to see the results of the shooting.  It was also noted
that during this incident, the veteran was intoxicated with
hashish, which also confused the picture.  The examiner
opined that the veteran's description of symptoms related to
a traumatic stressor did not meet the criterion for PTSD.
The examiner also opined that the veteran's criterion A
stressor for PTSD was of questionable intensity.

In July 2001, the Board remanded the case back to the RO in
order for the RO to attempt to verify the veteran's claimed
in-service stressors.  In September 2001, the RO sent a
letter to the veteran requesting information pertaining to
his alleged in-service stressors.  He did not respond to this
letter.

In April 2002, the U. S. Armed Services Center for Research
of Unit Records reported that it was unable to verify any of
the veteran's claimed in-service stressors as insufficient
information had been supplied.  This agency responded that
the veteran had to supply specific dates, within sixty days
of the incident, locations of the incidents and full names of
the casualties.

In January 2003, the Board attempted to verify the veteran's
claimed in-service stressors.  The Board requested the U. S.
Armed Services Center for Research of Unit Records to verify
four incidents which the veteran alleged had occurred between
January 1973 and October 1974 while he was serving with the
3/11 Armored Calvary.  The four reported incidents were where
East German troops shot someone trying to escape from East
Germany; an incident wherein a women trying to escape from
East Germany was blown up by a land mine; an incident where a
service person was thrown out of a second story window of a
barracks; and an incident where a service person in the
veteran's unit hung himself.

In July 2003, the RO again sent a letter to the veteran
requesting that he provide specific information regarding his
claimed in-service stressors.  The veteran never responded to
the request for additional information.

Analysis

The Board finds that service connection is not warranted for
PTSD based on a lack of a verified inservice stressor.  The
service personnel records do not demonstrate that the veteran
participated in combat and he has not alleged such
participation.  All the reported in-service stressors
concerned non-combat related situations.  As such, these
stressors require credible supporting evidence from service
records or other sources for verification.

The veteran's self-reported stressors consists of witnessing
East German Border Guards shooting a person trying to escape
to West Germany; an incident wherein a women trying to escape
from East Germany was blown up by a land mine; an incident
where a serviceperson was thrown out of a second story window
of a barracks; and an incident where a serviceperson in the
veteran's unit hung himself.  The Board notes that, with
regard to all of the above stressors, the veteran has not
provided sufficient evidence to conduct a meaningful search
of records which could verify the claimed in-service
stressors.  He failed to provide specific locations, dates,
unit descriptions or names of participants.  Additionally, he
has provided conflicting accounts of some of the claimed
stressors.  While he reported in November 1995 and January
1997 that he actually witnessed a body hanging from a window,
at the time of a January 1997 VA examination, he reported
that he did not actually witness the hanging body but was
only informed of the incident.  Significantly, he also
reported that his major stressor, witnessing the shooting of
a person by East German soldiers, was not reported to anyone
as he was not supposed to be where the event took place.
Regardless of these facts, the RO did attempt to verify the
veteran's allegations, without success.

There is no official verification that the veteran witnessed
the claimed stressors.  However, the Board acknowledges that
additional verifying evidence may be obtained from sources
other than the veteran's service records.  See Moreau v.
Brown, 9 Vet.  App. 389, 395 (1996).  Nevertheless, the
record does not include any such additional verifying
evidence such as statements from fellow service members.

After reviewing the claims file, the Board must conclude that
the record does not include evidence corroborating the
veteran's claimed stressors.  While there are diagnoses of
PTSD in the present case, applicable law provides that a
diagnosis of PTSD must be based on verified stressors.  In
this case, there has been no such verification.  A diagnosis
of PTSD which is based on an examination which relied upon an
unverified history is inadequate.  See West v. Brown, 7 Vet.
App. 70, 77-78 (1994).  In sum, as the evidence does not show
that the engaged in combat and the claimed stressors are
otherwise unverified, there is therefore no basis for finding
that service connection for PTSD is warranted.

In reaching this determination, the Board is unable to find
such a state of approximate balance of the positive evidence
with the negative evidence to otherwise warrant a favorable
decision.  38 U.S.C.A. � 5107(b).

ORDER

The appeal is denied.

____________________________________________
	ALAN S. PEEVY
	Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals

 Department of Veterans Affairs

YOUR RIGHTS TO APPEAL OUR DECISION

The attached decision by the Board of Veterans' Appeals (BVA or Board) is
the final decision for all issues addressed in the "Order" section of the
decision.  The Board may also choose to remand an issue or issues to the
local VA office for additional development.   If the Board did this in your
case, then a "Remand" section follows the "Order."  However, you cannot
appeal an issue remanded to the local VA office because a remand is not a
final decision. The advice below on how to appeal a claim applies only to
issues that were allowed, denied, or dismissed in the "Order."
If you are satisfied with the outcome of your appeal, you do not need to do
anything.  We will return your file to your local VA office to implement
the BVA's decision.  However, if you are not satisfied with the Board's
decision on any or all of the issues allowed, denied, or dismissed, you
have the following options, which are listed in no particular order of
importance:
?	Appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims
(Court)
?	File with the Board a motion for reconsideration of this decision
?	File with the Board a motion to vacate this decision
?	File with the Board a motion for revision of this decision based on
clear and unmistakable error.
Although it would not affect this BVA decision, you may choose to also:
?	Reopen your claim at the local VA office by submitting new and
material evidence.
There is no time limit for filing a motion for reconsideration, a motion to
vacate, or a motion for revision based on clear and unmistakable error with
the Board, or a claim to reopen at the local VA office.  None of these
things is mutually exclusive - you can do all five things at the same time
if you wish.  However, if you file a Notice of Appeal with the Court and a
motion with the Board at the same time, this may delay your case because of
jurisdictional conflicts. If you file a Notice of Appeal with the Court
before you file a motion with the BVA, the BVA will not be able to consider
your motion without the Court's permission.

How long do I have to start my appeal to the Court?  You have 120 days from
the date this decision was mailed to you (as shown on the first page of
this decision) to file a Notice of Appeal with the United States Court of
Appeals for Veterans Claims.  If you also want to file a motion for
reconsideration or a motion to vacate, you will still have time to appeal
to the Court.  As long as you file your motion(s) with the Board within 120
days of the date this decision was mailed to you, you will then have
another 120 days from the date the BVA decides the motion for
reconsideration or the motion to vacate to appeal to the Court.  You should
know that even if you have a representative, as discussed below, it is your
responsibility to make sure that your appeal to Court is filed on time.

How do I appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims?
Send your Notice of Appeal to the Court at:

Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims
625 Indiana Avenue, NW, Suite 900
Washington, DC 20004-2950

You can get information about the Notice of Appeal, the procedure for
filing a Notice of Appeal, the filing fee (or a motion to waive the filing
fee if payment would cause financial hardship), and other matters covered
by the Court's rules directly from the Court. You can also get this
information from the Court's web site on the Internet at
www.vetapp.uscourts.gov, and you can download forms directly from that
website.  The Court's facsimile number is (202) 501-5848.

To ensure full protection of your right of appeal to the Court, you must
file your Notice of Appeal with the Court, not with the Board, or any other
VA office.

How do I file a motion for reconsideration? You can file a motion asking
the BVA to reconsider any part of this decision by writing a letter to the
BVA stating why you believe that the BVA committed an obvious error of fact
or law in this decision, or stating that new and material military service
records have been discovered that apply to your appeal. If the BVA has
decided more than one issue, be sure to tell us which issue(s) you want
reconsidered. Send your letter to:
Director, Management and Administration (014)
Board of Veterans' Appeals
810 Vermont Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20420

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Remember, the Board places no time limit on filing a motion for
reconsideration, and you can do this at any time. However, if you also plan
to appeal this decision to the Court, you must file your motion within 120
days from the date of this decision.

How do I file a motion to vacate? You can file a motion asking the BVA to
vacate any part of this decision by writing a letter to the BVA stating why
you believe you were denied due process of law during your appeal. For
example, you were denied your right to representation through action or
inaction by VA personnel, you were not provided a Statement of the Case or
Supplemental Statement of the Case, or you did not get a personal hearing
that you requested. You can also file a motion to vacate any part of this
decision on the basis that the Board allowed benefits based on false or
fraudulent evidence.  Send this motion to the address above for the
Director, Management and Administration, at the Board.  Remember, the Board
places no time limit on filing a motion to vacate, and you can do this at
any time. However, if you also plan to appeal this decision to the Court,
you must file your motion within 120 days from the date of this decision.

How do I file a motion to revise the Board's decision on the basis of clear
and unmistakable error? You can file a motion asking that the Board revise
this decision if you believe that the decision is based on "clear and
unmistakable error" (CUE).  Send this motion to the address above for the
Director, Management and Administration, at the Board. You should be
careful when preparing such a motion because it must meet specific
requirements, and the Board will not review a final decision on this basis
more than once. You should carefully review the Board's Rules of Practice
on CUE, 38 C.F.R. 20.1400 -- 20.1411, and seek help from a qualified
representative before filing such a motion. See discussion on
representation below. Remember, the Board places no time limit on filing a
CUE review motion, and you can do this at any time.

How do I reopen my claim? You can ask your local VA office to reopen your
claim by simply sending them a statement indicating that you want to reopen
your claim.  However, to be successful in reopening your claim, you must
submit new and material evidence to that office. See 38 C.F.R. 3.156(a).

Can someone represent me in my appeal?  Yes. You can always represent
yourself in any claim before VA, including the BVA, but you can also
appoint someone to represent you.  An accredited representative of a
recognized service organization may represent you free of charge.  VA
approves these organizations to help veterans, service members, and
dependents prepare their claims and present them to VA. An accredited
representative works for the service organization and knows how to prepare
and present claims. You can find a listing of these organizations on the
Internet at: www.va.gov/vso.  You can also choose to be represented by a
private attorney or by an "agent." (An agent is a person who is not a
lawyer, but is specially accredited by VA.)

If you want someone to represent you before the Court, rather than before
VA, then you can get information on how to do so by writing directly to the
Court.  Upon request, the Court will provide you with a state-by-state
listing of persons admitted to practice before the Court who have indicated
their availability to represent appellants.  This information is also
provided on the Court's website at www.vetapp.uscourts.gov.

Do I have to pay an attorney or agent to represent me?  Except for a claim
involving a home or small business VA loan under Chapter 37 of title 38,
United States Code, attorneys or agents cannot charge you a fee or accept
payment for services they provide before the date BVA makes a final
decision on your appeal. If you hire an attorney or accredited agent within
1 year of a final BVA decision, then the attorney or agent is allowed to
charge you a fee for representing you before VA in most situations.  An
attorney can also charge you for representing you before the Court.  VA
cannot pay fees of attorneys or agents.

Fee for VA home and small business loan cases:  An attorney or agent may
charge you a reasonable fee for services involving a VA home loan or small
business loan.  For more information, read section 5904, title 38, United
States Code.

In all cases, a copy of any fee agreement between you and an attorney or
accredited agent must be sent to:

Office of the Senior Deputy Vice Chairman (012)
Board of Veterans' Appeals
810 Vermont Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20420

The Board may decide, on its own, to review a fee agreement for
reasonableness, or you or your attorney or agent can file a motion asking
the Board to do so. Send such a motion to the address above for the Office
of the Senior Deputy Vice Chairman at the Board.

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series: legacy

judge_norm: R F WILLIAMS

disposition: denied

text:
Citation Nr: 0405000
Decision Date: 02/23/04    Archive Date: 02/27/04

DOCKET NO.  03-15 768	)	DATE
	)
	)

On appeal from the
Department of Veterans Affairs Regional Office in Manila, the
Republic of the Philippines

THE ISSUE

Basic eligibility for Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)
benefits.

ATTORNEY FOR THE BOARD

Carolyn Wiggins, Counsel

INTRODUCTION

This appeal arises from a February 2002 determination of the
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Regional Office (RO) in
Manila, Republic of the Philippines which denied basic
eligibility for VA benefits.

FINDINGS OF FACT

The service department has informed VA that the appellant had
no service as a member of the Philippines Commonwealth Army,
including the recognized guerrillas, in the service of the
United States Armed Forces.

CONCLUSION OF LAW

The appellant does not have recognized active military
service for purposes of eligibility for VA benefits.
38 U.S.C.A. �� 101, 107 (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. �� 3.1, 3.6,
3.7, 3.203 (2003).

REASONS AND BASES FOR FINDING AND CONCLUSION

VCAA.  There was a significant change in the law prior to the
pendency of this appeal with the enactment of the Veterans
Claims Assistance Act of 2000 (the VCAA), Pub. L. No. 106-
475, 114 Stat. 2096 (2000), codified at 38 U.S.C. �� 5102,
5103, 5103A, 5107) (West 2002).  VA has issued final
regulations to implement these statutory changes.  See 66
Fed. Reg. 45,620, et seq. (Aug. 29, 2001) codified as amended
at 38 C.F.R. �� 3.102, 3.156(a), 3.159 and 3.326(a) (2003).

These new provisions redefine the obligations of VA with
respect to the duty to assist and include an enhanced duty to
notify a claimant as to the information and evidence
necessary to substantiate a claim for VA benefits.  This
change in law is applicable to all claims filed on or after
the date of enactment of the VCAA, or filed before the date
of enactment and not yet final as of that date.

In the present case, the RO did provide the appellant with
the duty to notify and assist provisions of VCAA and its
implementing regulations.  After receiving the veteran's
application for VA benefits in July 2001 the RO responded
immediately and wrote the appellant a letter explaining how
to complete his application.  In September 2001 the RO sent a
letter to the appellant informing him of the provisions of
the VCAA, what evidence was necessary to support a grant of
the benefits claimed and offering assistance in obtaining
evidence.  In October 2001 the RO sent another letter to the
appellant informing him how to complete his application.
Thus, VCAA notice was provided to the claimant before the
initial unfavorable RO decision.  Pelegrini v. Principi, No.
01-944 (U.S. Vet. App. Jan. 13, 2004).  In the February 2002
letter and the May 2003 statement of the case the RO informed
the veteran of the evidence which had been obtained and
considered and again explained what evidence was necessary to
support his claim.

The Board finds that adjudication of this case at the present
time is proper.  Absent the required certification of service
from the service department, which is determinative as a
threshold matter in the present case, there is no reasonable
possibility that further development of the claim by VA would
substantiate the claim.  Nor, in the context of the law that
applies to this case, is there any indication in the record
that there is any evidence that could substantiate the claim
that has not been obtained.

The VCAA recognizes certain circumstances where VA will
refrain from or discontinue providing assistance.  VA will
refrain from providing assistance in obtaining evidence for a
claim if the substantially complete application for benefits
indicates that there is no reasonable possibility that any
assistance VA would provide to the claimant would
substantiate the claim.  VA will discontinue providing
assistance in obtaining evidence for a claim if the evidence
obtained indicates that there is no reasonable possibility
that further assistance would substantiate the claim.
Circumstances in which VA will refrain from or discontinue
providing assistance in obtaining evidence include, but are
not limited to, the claimant's ineligibility for the benefit
sought because of lack of qualifying service, lack of veteran
status, or other lack of legal eligibility.  66 Fed. Reg.
45,620, 45,631 (Aug. 29, 2001), codified as amended at 38
C.F.R � 3.159(d).

Furthermore, where the facts averred by a claimant cannot
conceivably result in any disposition of the appeal other
than affirmance of the decision, the case should not be
remanded for development that could not possibly change the
outcome of the decision.   The failure to carry out such
required development under those circumstances is
nonprejudicial error under 38 U.S.C.A. � 7261(b) (in
conducting review of BVA decision, the Court shall take due
account of the rule of prejudicial error); cf. Soyini v.
Derwinski, 1 Vet. App. 540, 546 (1991) (stating "strict
adherence [to the law] does not dictate an unquestioning,
blind adherence in the face of overwhelming evidence in
support of the result in a particular case.  Such adherence
would result in this Court's unnecessarily imposing
additional burdens on the BVA and [the Secretary] with no
benefit flowing to the veteran").  These legal principles
were stated clearly in Valiao v. Principi, 17 Vet. App. 229
(2003).

The Board notes that in a decision promulgated on September
22, 2003, Paralyzed Veterans of America (PVA) v. Secretary of
Veterans Affairs, 345 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2003), the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal
Circuit) invalidated the 30-day response period contained in
38 C.F.R. � 3.159(b)(1) as inconsistent with 38 U.S.C.�
5103(b)(1).  The Federal Circuit made a conclusion similar to
the one reached in Disabled Am. Veterans v. Secretary of
Veterans Affairs, 327 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2003).  The
Federal Circuit found that the 30-day period provided in �
3.159(b)(1) to respond to a VCCA duty to notify is misleading
and detrimental to claimants whose claims are prematurely
denied short of the statutory one-year period provided for
response.  However, the recently enacted Veterans Benefits
Act of 2003 permits VA to adjudicate a claim within a year of
receipt of the claim.  The provision is retroactive to the
date of the VCAA, November 9, 2000.  See Veterans Benefits
Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-183, � ___, 117 Stat. 2651, ___
(Dec. 16, 2003) (to be codified at 38 U.S.C. �  ____).

The enactment of the VCAA has no material effect on
adjudication of the claim currently before the Board.  The
law, not the evidence, controls the outcome of this appeal
(see Sabonis v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 426 (1994)).  Taking these
factors into consideration, further expending of the VA's
resources is not warranted and there is no prejudice to the
appellant in proceeding to consider the claim.  See Bernard
v. Brown, 4 Vet. App. 384, 394 (1993).

Factual Background.  The appellant filed his claim for VA
benefits in July 2001.  On his application form he listed
that he served from December 1941 to August 1945 and had been
a prisoner of war.

In August 2001 the RO requested verification of the veteran's
service through official channels.

The RO wrote the appellant a letter in September 2001
explaining what evidence was necessary to support his claim.
The letter also informed the appellant the RO had requested
verification of the his claimed service from the Department
of the Army.

In February 2002 the RO received a response regarding the
appellant's claimed service from the National Personnel
Records Center (NPRC).  They responded as follows:

Subject has no service as a member of the
Philippine Commonwealth Army, including
recognized guerrillas, in the service of
the United States Armed Forces.

The RO wrote the appellant a letter in February 2002
explaining that he had no verified service and was therefore
not eligible for VA benefits.  The letter listed the evidence
which had been obtained and considered in reaching that
determination.

In May 2003 the appellant submitted documents which he
asserted verified his service.  They included a certificate
entitled Walter Cushing Guerrillas Certificate of Service, a
Republic of the Philippines Department of National Defense
Certificate and a Philippine Army certificate from the
Military Police Training School.

Pertinent Laws and Regulations.  Eligibility for VA benefits
is based on statutory and regulatory provisions which define
an individual's legal status as a veteran of active military
service.  38 U.S.C.A. �� 101(2), 101(24) (West 2002); 38
C.F.R. �� 3.1, 3.6 (2003).  As a predicate requirement for a
grant of VA benefits, a claimant must establish that the
individual upon whose service benefits are sought is a
"veteran."  The term "veteran" means a person who served
in the active military, naval, or air service, and who was
discharged or released therefrom under conditions other than
dishonorable.  38 U.S.C.A. � 101(2) (West 2002); 38 C.F.R. �
3.1(d) (2003).  See Selley v. Brown, 6 Vet. App. 196, 198
(1994).

Service in the Philippine Scouts and in the organized
military forces of the Government of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines, including recognized guerrilla service, may
constitute recognized service in the armed forces of the
United States for VA purposes.  38 U.S.C.A. � 107 (West
2002).  However, such service must be certified as qualifying
by appropriate military authority.  38 C.F.R. � 3.203 (2003).

If a claimant does not submit evidence of military service,
or the information is insufficient, VA must request the
information from the service department.  Sarmiento v. Brown,
7 Vet. App. 80, 82 (1994); see also Laruan v. West,11 Vet.
App. 80, 82 (1998) [observing that if there is reason to
believe that information provided to service department was
erroneous (e.g., misspelled name), VA may be required to
resubmit request for information to service department].

Only service department records can establish if and when a
person was serving on qualifying active service.  Venturella
v. Gober, 11 Vet. App. 340, 341 (1997); Cahall v. Brown,
7 Vet. App. 232, 237 (1994).  The service department's
findings are binding and conclusive upon VA.  VA does not
have the authority to alter the findings of the service
department.  Duro v. Derwinski, 2Vet. App. 530, 532 (1992);
see Soria v. Brown, 118 F.3d 747, 749 (Fed. Cir. 1997).

Analysis.  In order to qualify for VA benefits, a claimant
must demonstrate that he, has basic eligibility for the
benefits claimed.  The United States Court of Appeals for
Veterans Claims (known as the United States Court of Veterans
Appeals prior to March 1, 1999) (hereinafter the Court) held
in Duro, 2 Vet. App. at 532, that the service department's
findings as to the service of an individual is binding on VA
for the purposes of establishing service in the U.S. Armed
Forces, Philippine Commonwealth Army, or Philippine
guerrillas in the service of the U.S. Armed Forces.  The
Court has held that a service department determination as to
an individual's service shall be binding on VA, unless a
reasonable basis exists for questioning it.  See Manibog v.
Brown, 8 Vet. App. 465, 468 (1996).

The appellant has not presented any certification from the
service department that indicates he has recognized service.
The documents he has presented are from the Philippine
government and are not the required documentation of service.
38 C.F.R. � 3.203.

In Soria, 118 F.3d. at 748, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit noted that where service
department certification was required, VA has long treated
the service department's decision on such matters as
conclusive and binding on VA.  If the United States service
department refuses to verify the claimed service of the
appellant, the applicant's only recourse lies with the
relevant service department, not VA.  38 C.F.R. �� 3.9 and
3.203.

Inasmuch as VA is bound to accept the findings of the service
department in this regard, the Board finds that the appellant
has no service in the Armed Forces of the United States or as
a member of the Philippine Commonwealth Army, including the
recognized guerrillas, in the service of the U.S. Armed
Forces.  See 38 C.F.R. � 3.203; see also Duro, 2 Vet. App. at
532.  Thus, he is not considered a "veteran" for purposes
of establishing eligibility to VA benefits.  Accordingly, the
appellant's claim for entitlement to VA benefits must be
denied as a matter of law.  See Sabonis v. Brown, 6 Vet. App.
426 (1994).

ORDER

The claim of entitlement to basic eligibility for VA benefits
is denied.

____________________________________________
	R. F. Williams
	Veterans Law Judge, Board of Veterans' Appeals

 Department of Veterans Affairs

YOUR RIGHTS TO APPEAL OUR DECISION

The attached decision by the Board of Veterans' Appeals (BVA or Board) is
the final decision for all issues addressed in the "Order" section of the
decision.  The Board may also choose to remand an issue or issues to the
local VA office for additional development.   If the Board did this in your
case, then a "Remand" section follows the "Order."  However, you cannot
appeal an issue remanded to the local VA office because a remand is not a
final decision. The advice below on how to appeal a claim applies only to
issues that were allowed, denied, or dismissed in the "Order."
If you are satisfied with the outcome of your appeal, you do not need to do
anything.  We will return your file to your local VA office to implement
the BVA's decision.  However, if you are not satisfied with the Board's
decision on any or all of the issues allowed, denied, or dismissed, you
have the following options, which are listed in no particular order of
importance:
?	Appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims
(Court)
?	File with the Board a motion for reconsideration of this decision
?	File with the Board a motion to vacate this decision
?	File with the Board a motion for revision of this decision based on
clear and unmistakable error.
Although it would not affect this BVA decision, you may choose to also:
?	Reopen your claim at the local VA office by submitting new and
material evidence.
There is no time limit for filing a motion for reconsideration, a motion to
vacate, or a motion for revision based on clear and unmistakable error with
the Board, or a claim to reopen at the local VA office.  None of these
things is mutually exclusive - you can do all five things at the same time
if you wish.  However, if you file a Notice of Appeal with the Court and a
motion with the Board at the same time, this may delay your case because of
jurisdictional conflicts. If you file a Notice of Appeal with the Court
before you file a motion with the BVA, the BVA will not be able to consider
your motion without the Court's permission.

How long do I have to start my appeal to the Court?  You have 120 days from
the date this decision was mailed to you (as shown on the first page of
this decision) to file a Notice of Appeal with the United States Court of
Appeals for Veterans Claims.  If you also want to file a motion for
reconsideration or a motion to vacate, you will still have time to appeal
to the Court.  As long as you file your motion(s) with the Board within 120
days of the date this decision was mailed to you, you will then have
another 120 days from the date the BVA decides the motion for
reconsideration or the motion to vacate to appeal to the Court.  You should
know that even if you have a representative, as discussed below, it is your
responsibility to make sure that your appeal to Court is filed on time.

How do I appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims?
Send your Notice of Appeal to the Court at:

Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims
625 Indiana Avenue, NW, Suite 900
Washington, DC 20004-2950

You can get information about the Notice of Appeal, the procedure for
filing a Notice of Appeal, the filing fee (or a motion to waive the filing
fee if payment would cause financial hardship), and other matters covered
by the Court's rules directly from the Court. You can also get this
information from the Court's web site on the Internet at
www.vetapp.uscourts.gov, and you can download forms directly from that
website.  The Court's facsimile number is (202) 501-5848.

To ensure full protection of your right of appeal to the Court, you must
file your Notice of Appeal with the Court, not with the Board, or any other
VA office.

How do I file a motion for reconsideration? You can file a motion asking
the BVA to reconsider any part of this decision by writing a letter to the
BVA stating why you believe that the BVA committed an obvious error of fact
or law in this decision, or stating that new and material military service
records have been discovered that apply to your appeal. If the BVA has
decided more than one issue, be sure to tell us which issue(s) you want
reconsidered. Send your letter to:
Director, Management and Administration (014)
Board of Veterans' Appeals
810 Vermont Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20420

VA
FORM
JUN
2003
(RS)

4597
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1
CONTINUED

Remember, the Board places no time limit on filing a motion for
reconsideration, and you can do this at any time. However, if you also plan
to appeal this decision to the Court, you must file your motion within 120
days from the date of this decision.

How do I file a motion to vacate? You can file a motion asking the BVA to
vacate any part of this decision by writing a letter to the BVA stating why
you believe you were denied due process of law during your appeal. For
example, you were denied your right to representation through action or
inaction by VA personnel, you were not provided a Statement of the Case or
Supplemental Statement of the Case, or you did not get a personal hearing
that you requested. You can also file a motion to vacate any part of this
decision on the basis that the Board allowed benefits based on false or
fraudulent evidence.  Send this motion to the address above for the
Director, Management and Administration, at the Board.  Remember, the Board
places no time limit on filing a motion to vacate, and you can do this at
any time. However, if you also plan to appeal this decision to the Court,
you must file your motion within 120 days from the date of this decision.

How do I file a motion to revise the Board's decision on the basis of clear
and unmistakable error? You can file a motion asking that the Board revise
this decision if you believe that the decision is based on "clear and
unmistakable error" (CUE).  Send this motion to the address above for the
Director, Management and Administration, at the Board. You should be
careful when preparing such a motion because it must meet specific
requirements, and the Board will not review a final decision on this basis
more than once. You should carefully review the Board's Rules of Practice
on CUE, 38 C.F.R. 20.1400 -- 20.1411, and seek help from a qualified
representative before filing such a motion. See discussion on
representation below. Remember, the Board places no time limit on filing a
CUE review motion, and you can do this at any time.

How do I reopen my claim? You can ask your local VA office to reopen your
claim by simply sending them a statement indicating that you want to reopen
your claim.  However, to be successful in reopening your claim, you must
submit new and material evidence to that office. See 38 C.F.R. 3.156(a).

Can someone represent me in my appeal?  Yes. You can always represent
yourself in any claim before VA, including the BVA, but you can also
appoint someone to represent you.  An accredited representative of a
recognized service organization may represent you free of charge.  VA
approves these organizations to help veterans, service members, and
dependents prepare their claims and present them to VA. An accredited
representative works for the service organization and knows how to prepare
and present claims. You can find a listing of these organizations on the
Internet at: www.va.gov/vso.  You can also choose to be represented by a
private attorney or by an "agent." (An agent is a person who is not a
lawyer, but is specially accredited by VA.)

If you want someone to represent you before the Court, rather than before
VA, then you can get information on how to do so by writing directly to the
Court.  Upon request, the Court will provide you with a state-by-state
listing of persons admitted to practice before the Court who have indicated
their availability to represent appellants.  This information is also
provided on the Court's website at www.vetapp.uscourts.gov.

Do I have to pay an attorney or agent to represent me?  Except for a claim
involving a home or small business VA loan under Chapter 37 of title 38,
United States Code, attorneys or agents cannot charge you a fee or accept
payment for services they provide before the date BVA makes a final
decision on your appeal. If you hire an attorney or accredited agent within
1 year of a final BVA decision, then the attorney or agent is allowed to
charge you a fee for representing you before VA in most situations.  An
attorney can also charge you for representing you before the Court.  VA
cannot pay fees of attorneys or agents.

Fee for VA home and small business loan cases:  An attorney or agent may
charge you a reasonable fee for services involving a VA home loan or small
business loan.  For more information, read section 5904, title 38, United
States Code.

In all cases, a copy of any fee agreement between you and an attorney or
accredited agent must be sent to:

Office of the Senior Deputy Vice Chairman (012)
Board of Veterans' Appeals
810 Vermont Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20420

The Board may decide, on its own, to review a fee agreement for
reasonableness, or you or your attorney or agent can file a motion asking
the Board to do so. Send such a motion to the address above for the Office
of the Senior Deputy Vice Chairman at the Board.

VA
FORM
JUN
2003
(RS)

4597
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